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ABSTRACT:  Sociologists have long identified export partner concentration as a potential barrier 
to economic and social development in poor countries.  This study explores trends in poor-country 
export partner concentration in the current age of globalisation using data from the IMF's Direction 
of Trade Statistics database.  Standard accounts of globalisation suggest that the world is becoming 
increasingly uniform when viewed from different vantage points; this suggests that export partner 
concentration should be declining as countries find new markets for their products.  We find little 
support for this position, at least with regard to poor countries.  Instead, average export partner 
concentration among poor countries has barely changed since 1980, and has actually risen since the 
mid-1990s.  We verify these findings using multiple operationalisations of trade dependence.  All 
our results consistently demonstrate that globalisation does not have a broad, uniform, flattening 
impact on poor-country trade patterns. 
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Global Export Partner Concentration since 1980: 
Trends in Dependency and Globalisation 
 
Introduction 
When poor countries rely on just one or a small number of countries as the markets for their 
exports, they are in effect dependent on those export partners in many ways.  The colonialism and 
both informal and formal imperialism of the first few centuries of global capitalism created many 
such dependent relationships.  Poor, dependent countries can have little choice but to implement the 
demands of the partner country or countries, whether these be for particular product specifications, 
particular forms of economic governance, or even particular political forms, such as electoral 
democracy (or, in an earlier age, lack of electoral democracy).  The argument can be made that 
unless a poor country has a reasonably large number of trading partners, it cannot be fully 
sovereign. 
Globalisation was supposed to have changed all that, creating a 'flat' world in which every 
actor in the world has easy access to every other actor in the world.  In an early and influential 
summation of the emerging globalisation literature, Guillen (2001:236) influentially defined 
globalisation as 'a process leading to greater interdependence and mutual awareness (reflexivity) 
among economic, political and social units in the world'.  This is consistent with Giddens' (1990:64) 
seminal characterization of globalization as a 'reconfiguration of geography' in which the effective 
distances that separate the peoples of the world are getting smaller every year.  This leads to what 
(Robertson 1992:8) called an 'intensification of the consciousness of the world as a whole'.  In the 
standard narrative, pioneered by sociologists and since embraced by economists, journalists and 
pundits, globalisation is tearing down barriers and reconfiguring long-established relationships 
among the countries (and people) of the world.  The overriding message has been that globalisation 
brings homogenisation; even anti-globalisation activism is often framed in terms of resistance to 
globalisation's homogenising tendencies. 
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From an empirical standpoint, globalisation is most often operationalized in terms of 
international trade (Babones 2007).  Total global levels of trade have increased steadily in the age 
of globalisation, from 39% of global GDP in 1990 to 57% in 2006 (World Bank figures).  Trade 
levels continued rising through 2008, and after a sharp decline in 2009 have rebounded in 2010.  
Globalisation seems to imply not only an increase in global trade, but a change in its character.  To 
the extent that globalisation opens opportunities to interact with the world as a whole, previously 
established patterns of global trade based on historical and especially colonial relationships should 
be breaking down.  One positive characteristic of the age of globalisation should thus be the final 
dissolution of exploitative patterns of trade in which poor countries find their export opportunities 
monopolized by one or a few powerful rich countries.  Whatever its pros and cons, globalisation 
should at least spell the end of the era of dependency. 
Dependency is a multifaceted concept, but export partner concentration has long been 
considered an important indicator of dependency (Hirschman 1945; Galtung 1971).  It has been 
used especially in the cross-national regression-based literature on dependency and economic 
growth.  Export partner concentration has been associated empirically with such negative outcomes 
as slow economic growth (Kentor and Boswell 2003), high inequality (Lee et al 2007) and 
environmental devastation (Shandra 2007).  Sociologists have historically seen export partner 
concentration in a uniformly negative light, but some economists actually argue that export partner 
concentration should be associated with faster growth (Kali et al 2007), seeing it as a sign of 
economically the efficient allocation of resources. 
Studies of export partner concentration, however, have been hampered by the enormous data 
processing demands of computing them.  We have computed export, import and total trade 
concentration levels for every country of the world for the period 1980-2006.  We illustrate 
changing patterns of export partner concentration over time using a constant sample of 127 
countries for which fully saturated time series data are available in our larger dataset.  In the next 
section below we describe the methods we used to convert the available raw data into usable 
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concentration measures.  We then report trends in export concentration by four different measures, 
poor versus rich countries, and region of the world.  In the ensuing discussion we illustrate ways in 
which export partner concentration may be empirically problematic as an indicator of dependency.  
We then return to the question of what our results say about globalisation, concluding that 
globalisation has not had the expected effect of reducing export partner concentrations in poor 
countries. 
 
Data and Methods 
We have computed export partner concentrations for all of the countries of the world that 
report their export levels in the International Monetary Fund's (IMF's) Direction of Trade Statistics 
(DOTS) database for the years 1980-2006.  We end our analyses in 2006 since, due to reporting 
lags, data more recent than 2006 are not yet complete.  In all, 184 countries are included in the raw 
data, though not all of these existed as countries over the entire 27-year period.  The DOTS 
database includes a matrix of export flows from and to nearly all the countries of the world.  Thus, 
for each year there are 33,856 entries (200 entries for each of 200 countries).  Our analyses focus on 
just the 127 countries that existed and reported trade data continuously over the 27 study years, but 
all 184 countries in the DOTS database are recorded in our data as possible trading partners for 
those 127 countries.  As a result, our concentration figures include partners that are not among our 
sample countries; for example, the Soviet Union was a major export destination for Poland, and is 
included in Poland's export statistics for the years 1980-1991, but the Soviet Union is not itself 
among our study countries, since it did not exist as a country throughout the entire study period. 
The 127 study countries collectively represented 86% of the world's population in 2006.  
The majority of the excluded countries (by population) are what are now the post-Soviet states, 
which in any case would represent problematic cases from the standpoint of dependency theory 
since they were not fully integrated into the larger capitalist world-economy.  Yugoslavia, 
Czechoslovakia and their successor states have also been excluded because of their breakups in the 
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course of the study period.  Germany has been included in the study sample through the aggregation 
of data from the former East and West Germanys in the period.  Yemen has similarly been included 
as a single, composite state.  Due to a quirk of IMF reporting, data for Luxembourg are subsumed 
within data for Belgium.  Other missing are, as usual in cross-national research, mainly very poor, 
war-torn, or small island states. 
We computed four measures of export partner concentration.  The first, the percentage of a 
country's export total that goes to its single largest export destination, is the measure most 
commonly used in the sociology literature.  We call this 1-CON for 'top 1 partner CONcentration'.  
In our view, however, the same logic that applies to dependency on a single partner would also 
apply to dependency on a small number of export partners.  We thus computed 3-CON and 5-CON 
measures as well (top three partner concentration and top five partner concentration, respectively).  
Further extending this logic, it seemed to us that concentration should matter the most when it 
represents concentration of trade into just one partner, a little less when it represents two partners, 
etc.  Hirschman (1945) argued seventy-five years ago that the appropriate measure of inordinate 
power in trade partnership relationships was geometric mean concentration: the sum of the squares 
of the concentrations with each partner.  This measure has entered the literature under the name of 
the Herfindahl index (Hirschman 1964).  We compute this for all countries in our dataset, using the 
conventional Herfindahl operationalisation which, unlike Hirschman's, does not take the square root 
of the final measure to return the measure to its original units (Hall and Tideman 1967). 
In our initial cross-national analyses (Figure 1) we report results for all four measures of 
concentration (1-CON, 3-CON, 5-CON and Herfindahl).  We find, however, that they are all 
closely correlated across countries and over time.  The 2006 cross-national correlation of 1-CON 
and Herfindahl concentration is r = 0.97, and annual percent changes in global average 1-CON are 
correlated r = 0.96 with annual percent changes in the global average Herfindahl index.  Thus, in 
our regional breakdown analyses (Figures 2 and 3) we report only results for the Herfindahl index 
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(as the most inclusive and sophisticated of the four).  Results for the other measures are 
substantially the same. 
 
Cross-National Results 
World average export partner concentration levels for the period 1980-2006 are reported in 
Figure 1.  All series rise slightly in the 1980s, then fall slightly thereafter back down to their 1980 
levels.  The most striking feature of the chart is its constancy over time.  It is not known whether the 
slight rise at the beginning of the series represents a continuation of a longer, earlier rise or just a 
temporary anomaly.  It is also unknown what affect the collapse of global trade in the 2008-2009 
financial crisis might have had on concentrations.  Nonetheless, the main result is that there has 
been virtually no change in export concentration over time.  This unremarkable result is quite 
remarkable.  The 1980s Latin American debt crisis, the 1990s Asian financial crisis, the global 
spread of neoliberal trade policies under the aegides of the IMF and World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and the progressive globalisation of the world-economy over the study period seem to have 
had no effect whatsoever on world average levels of export partner concentration.  This result seems 
at odds with standard accounts of economic globalisation. 
 
Export Partner Concentration by Region 
Average levels of export partner concentration for less-developed ('Poor') and developed 
('Rich') countries are reported in Figure 2.  Only the Herfindahl index is reported; trends for other 
measures are similar.  Official World Bank (2009) designations have been used.  The cutoff 
between poor and rich countries here represents a level of national income per capita of around 
$15,000 per year (approximately the level of Hungary, which is classed as rich; its eastern 
neighbors are classified as poor). 
Here the story is slightly different from the global story.  Levels of export partner 
concentration for poor countries are at all times higher than those for rich countries.  The two series 
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converge until 1989, when they come close to equalizing.  In the years after 1989, however, levels 
of export partner concentration decline by nearly 14% for rich countries but rise 9.5% for poor 
countries.  The divergence in the two series only becomes decisive in the mid-1990s.  This timing is 
consistent with trends in globalisation and the history of the WTO, which came into operation in 
1995. 
The poor-country data are broken out by region in Figure 3.  Official World Bank (2009) 
regions are used.  The official World Bank region of Eastern Europe and Central Asia includes the 
post-Soviet states of central Asia, but since these are excluded from the analyses only European 
countries are represented in the data graphed in Figure 3.  It is difficult to identify clear trends in the 
regional data because the individual series are so volatile, but some general patterns distinguishing 
the regions are clear.  Latin America, east Asia and sub-Saharan Africa show consistently high 
levels of export partner concentration, while the Middle East and north Africa, south Asia and 
eastern Europe show consistently low levels.  Note that the 1993 spike for south Asia is due to a 
massive one-year spike in Afghan exports to Russia recorded in the raw IMF data. 
 
Discussion 
Though accompanied by a massive expansion of world trade, globalisation has remarkably 
failed to change long-established patterns of trade for the majority of the countries of the world.  On 
the contrary, it seems to have reinforced preexisting patterns.  For rich countries, which already 
exhibited relatively low levels of export partner concentration, the globalisation era has been 
associated with further declines in concentration.  This generally accords with expectations: rich 
countries have taken advantage of globalisation to diversify the outlets for their products.  For poor 
countries the opposite has been true: in the decade following the founding of the WTO, poor 
country export partner concentration has increased.  To the extent that export partner concentration 
is an indicator of dependency in international economic relations, this is a worrying trend.  It 
potentially makes poor countries even more vulnerable to already-powerful external forces. 
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In light of the relatively high levels of export partner concentration in Latin America, it is 
perhaps not surprising that dependency theory has its roots in that region.  Latin America 
consistently exhibits the highest concentration levels of any world region.  For most Latin American 
countries, the top export destination is the United States, long resented throughout the region as an 
imperialist power.  East Asia, however, also exhibits high levels of export partner concentration, 
and as in Latin America the chief export destination is also the United States, but in east Asia there 
has been no accompanying rhetoric of dependent underdevelopment.  This may be attributed to east 
Asia's perceived economic success, but east Asia (outside Japan and Korea, which are in any case 
categorised here as developed countries) is, in fact, poorer on average than Latin America -- and by 
a wide margin.  National income per capita in Latin America is about three times that in east Asia. 
The cross-regional comparison of levels of export partner concentration highlights the 
danger of associating dependency broadly with neocolonial underdevelopment.  Across the Middle 
East, north Africa and south Asia average levels of export partner concentration are actually lower 
than those in the developed world, yet these regions suffered direct colonial exploitation right up 
through the mid-twentieth century, while most of Latin America has been at least formally 
independent for some 200 years.  Moreover, export partner concentration can only reasonably be 
linked to dependency if the most important export destinations are rich countries with histories of 
colonial exploitation.  Thus, though Argentina and Brazil report near-identical levels of 1-CON 
export partner concentration (18%), it surely means something that Brazil's top partner is the United 
States while Argentina's top partner is Brazil.  The unreflexive ascription of meaning to quantitative 
indicators in such cases can produce meaningless results. 
On the other hand, given appropriate contextualisation, export partner concentration might 
be a very meaningful indicator of dependency.  We mentioned above the dependency theory has its 
roots in Latin America.  Across the 81 poor countries in our constant sample that report GNP per 
capita data to the World Bank (2009), the correlation between the Herfindahl index and logged 
national income is a negligible r = -.02.  Across the 25 Latin American countries included in this 
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group, the correlation is r = -0.36.  This suggests that in Latin America export partner concentration 
may have arisen out of dependent relationships with imperial powers (primarily the United States), 
while in the rest of the world export partner concentration has arisen out of other factors, 
particularly in Asia. 
 
Conclusion 
Globalisation is usually construed to imply the breaking down of long-existing structures.  
International trade has been a major locus of globalisation, with overall levels of trade increasing 
dramatically in recent years, but the patterns of international trade seem remarkably stable.  If 
anything, those patterns seem to be ossifying, not dissolving: levels of export partner concentration 
in rich countries, already low, are declining, while levels of export partner concentration in poor 
countries, already high, are increasing.  We might see this as evidence of bifurcation in the effects 
of globalisation, with rich countries 'globalising' while poor countries are 'globalised' by others.  We 
plan to undertake more extensive analyses on this question in a full-length research paper using the 
concentration data developed here. 
  
11 
References 
Babones, S.J. (2007) 'Studying Globalization: Methodological Issues', pp. 144-161 in G. Ritzer (ed.) 
The Blackwell Companion to Globalization. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Galtung, J. (1971) 'A Structural Theory of Imperialism', Journal of Peace Research 8: 81-117. 
Giddens, A. (1990) The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Guillen, M.F. (2001) 'Is Globalization Civilizing, Destructive or Feeble? A Critique of Five Key 
Debates in the Social Science Literature', Annual Review of Sociology 27: 235-260. 
Hall, M. and N. Tideman (1967) 'Measures of Concentration', Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 62: 162-168. 
Hirschman, A.O. (1945) National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade. Berkeley: University 
of California Press. 
Hirschman, A.O.  (1964) 'The Paternity of an Index',  American Economic Review 54: 761-762. 
Kali, R., F. Mendez and J. Reyes (2007) 'Trade Structure and Economic Growth', The Journal of 
International Trade & Economic Development 16: 245-269.  
Kentor, J. and T. Boswell (2003) 'Foreign Capital Dependence and Development: A New 
Direction', American Sociological Review 68: 301-313. 
Lee, C., F. Nielsen and A. S. Alderson (2007) 'Income Inequality, Global Economy and the State', 
Social Forces 86: 77-111. 
Robertson, R. (1992) Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture. London: Sage Publications. 
Shandra, J.M. (2007) 'Economic Dependency, Repression, and Deforestation: A Quantitative, 
Cross-National Analysis', Sociological Inquiry 77: 543-571. 
World Bank (2009) World Development Indicators 2009. Washington: The World Bank Group. 
 
 
  
12 
Figure 1. Four Measures of Global Export Concentration, 1980-2006 
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Figure 2. Export Concentration for Rich versus Poor Countries, 1980-2006 
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Figure 3. Export Concentration for Poor Countries by Region, 1980-2006 
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